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Abstract— This article offers the first characterisation of mixed
Nash equilibria (MNE) for a wireless system with full-duplex
capable terminals that share a common channel via Aloha-
based contention. Focussing on a simple grid topology, we prove
that mixed MNE exist only if proportionality, driven by the
accuracy of self-interference cancellation, is granted between the
cost undergone for full- and half-duplex operations. The analysis
shows how a proper selection of such costs allows MNE that are
also optimal from a network viewpoint in terms of aggregate
throughput. The sensitivity of system performance to costs is
tackled and discussed considering the price of anarchy.
Index Terms— Aloha, Full-Duplex, Game Theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In-band full-duplex (FD) is gaining momentum as an alter-
native paradigm for wireless communications. Simultaneous
transmission and reception over the same band has indeed been
proven viable for practical devices [1], unleashing alluring
capacity improvements. In parallel, recent research efforts
have brought a good understanding of the key tradeoffs FD
triggers in more complex setups, buttressing the potential of
the technique in settings ranging from ad hoc to cellular
topologies [2], [3]. On the other hand, little attention has
been devoted to the utility a single user within a network
perceives when sending and receiving concurrently. In fact, FD
operations might entail a higher cost, e.g. in terms of energy,
complexity, or simply due to specific network pricing policies,
possibly becoming unattractive. Understanding whether and
under which conditions a user willingly embraces the new
technology is thus paramount for its success.
The present article tackles this crucial yet still elusive
question following a game-theoretic approach. To extract clear
and fundamental insights we focus on a four-node topology,
where players capable of transmitting in both half-duplex (HD)
and FD mode share a common channel via slotted Aloha. As
a primary contribution, we derive conditions for the existence
of mixed Nash equilibria (MNE) without strictly dominated
actions, highlighting the key role played by self-interference
cancellation when employing FD. Under such constraints, we
show that infinitely many MNE are admissible, characterise
them analytically, and provide mechanism design hints on
how to set the price of HD and FD transmissions to make
them appealing from the single user’s perspective. Moreover,
the optimality of MNE from a network-wide perspective is
discussed, proving that the maximum aggregate throughput
can indeed be reached at an equilibrium point. The sensitivity
of system performance to costs is also explored through the
notion of price of anarchy.
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Though medium access control (MAC) games have been
studied in HD networks [4], our contribution is the first to
apply them to Aloha-based FD systems, which are experi-
encing a revived interest for machine-type applications. In
[5], FD communications are modelled focusing on coalitional
games, whereas we tackle the non-cooperative case. Authors
in [6], instead, consider a two-player game with FD and HD
operation modes. Motivated by the potential inefficiency of
a NE where both use FD, a Bayesian game is analysed,
providing conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a
Bayesian NE and discussing extensions to the multiple-player
case. In contrast to this approach, this letter also considers the
possibility for a node to wait instead of always transmitting
using either FD or HD. Moreover, we analyse the existence
and uniqueness of mixed rather than pure or Bayesian NE.
The proper identification of the nodes’ access probabilities is
a key feature for the successful design and operation of a
MAC protocol, and the study of MNE can help towards this
direction. Finally, the proposed approach lays a base for the
study of broader random access networks.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this article, we focus on the grid topology
reported in Fig. 1, composed of two node pairs Pi = (Ai,Bi),
i = 1, 2. Users within a pair are located r meters apart,
while a distance d = κ r, κ > 0, separates the two couples.
Time is divided in subsequent slots, whose duration equals
the transmission time of a packet.1 At every slot, each pair
independently chooses how to access the shared wireless
channel, following one strategy in the set S = {w, tA, tB, tfd}.
When w is selected, no transmission is performed by the pair
over the slot. Conversely, tA indicates a HD data exchange
from Ai to Bi. In this case, the first node sends a packet
to its mate, which acts as a pure receiver during the slot.
Similarly, tB describes a link from Bi to Ai. Finally, the choice
of tfd implies the joint transmission of Ai and Bi, concurrently
sending data to each other resorting to FD techniques. From a
different angle, the system instantiates a slotted Aloha access,
where each node acts as a saturated source of packets for its
pair-mate.2
All transmissions are performed with power P , and the
wireless channel is affected by path-loss with exponent
α and Rayleigh block fading. Accordingly, a sent packet
reaches a node x meters away from the source with power
Pr(x) = P x
−αζ, where ζ is an exponential r.v. of unit mean,
1The terms packet and data unit will be used interchangeably.
2In this perspective, no feedback nor retransmission policies are considered.
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independently drawn for each link and across slots. At the re-
ceiver side, decoding is hindered by additive noise of power N
and possibly by interference. The latter, in turn, is given by two
components. Firstly, an undesired power I may reach the user
from concurrent transmissions performed within the other pair.
Secondly, if the node operates in FD mode, part of its emitted
power will leak into the receiver chain as self-interference (SI),
which we model following a well-established approach as ηP ,
η ∈ [0, 1) [2]. The overall signal to noise and interference ratio
(SNIR) can thus be expressed as Pr(r)/(N +I+ ηP ), where
the last addend in the denominator is elided if a receiver is
not concurrently transmitting. A threshold model for decoding
is assumed, so that a data unit is retrieved at the intended
addressee if and only if the experienced SNIR is larger than
a parameter θ, which embeds coding and modulation aspects.
Within this framework, the success probability of a trans-
mission can be derived once the strategies s1, s2 ∈ S of the
two pairs are given. Focussing on the reception of a packet at
node Bi, four cases have to be considered:
• Pj remains silent: no external interference affects recep-
tion at Bi, and the success probability evaluates to
ps(Bi | sj = w) = P
[
ζ >
θN
Pr−α + Pη
]
= e−θ(N+ηP )r
α/P
leaning on the exponential distribution of the fading
coefficient. The result can be conveniently written as
ps(Bi | sj = w) = βϕ, where ϕ := exp(−θNrα/P )
represents the success probability at a receiver in the sole
presence of noise and β := exp(−θηrα) accounts for
residual SI when the receiver operates in FD mode.3
• Pj chooses strategy tA: reception at Bi is af-
fected by external interference coming from Aj . Thus,
I = Pζ ′(d2 + r2)−α/2, where ζ ′ is the fading coeffi-
cient for the Aj–Bi link. Conditioning on ζ ′ and recall-
ing that d = κr, the success probability evaluates to
βϕ exp(−θ(κ + 1)2ζ ′). Averaging over the exponential
distribution eventually leads to ps(Bi | sj = tA) = βϕιf ,
where the ancillary term
ιf :=
1
1 + θ(1 + κ2)−α/2
captures the effect at a receiver of the interference gen-
erated by the farthest node of the competing pair.
• Pj chooses strategy tB: reception at Bi is affected
by external interference coming from Bj . Proceed-
ing along the steps discussed above, we readily get
ps(Bi | sj = tB) = βϕιc, introducing
ιc :=
1
1 + θκ−α
to describe the impact at Bi of interference generated by
the closest node of the other couple.
3Throughout our analysis, we focus on β > 1/2. Such an assumption does
not restrict the practical relevance of the derived results, as values of β close
to 1 are indeed required to leverage the potential of FD [2].
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Fig. 1. Reference topology for the system under study.
• Pj chooses strategy tfd: in this case Bi is affected
by interference coming from both Aj and Bj . Recall-
ing the mutual independence of all the fading coef-
ficients, we obtain the sought success probability as
ps(Bi | sj = tfd) = βϕ ιcιf .
Due to symmetry, the derived formulations hold for a
reception at node Ai as well.4 Moreover, while the reported
calculations have implicitly assumed the presence of self-
interference (ηP term), the results also capture performance
when nodes are operating in HD-mode, setting β = 1. For
the remainder of our discussion, it is also useful to note that
0 < ιc < ιf < 1 for any set of system parameters.
For the topology under study, we consider a normal form,
simultaneous move, non-cooperative game with complete in-
formation, modelling each pair as a selfish rational player
and assuming the set of players, the strategy sets and the
utility functions to be common knowledge. More specifically,
our focus is on mixed strategies, where at every slot a
couple draws an action s ∈ S following the probability mass
function (p.m.f.) pi = (piw, pitA , pitB , pitfd), independently of
the behaviour of its competitor. To characterise the game, we
introduce a utility function U : S → R+, which quantifies the
average payoff earned by a player. We shall concentrate on
utilities in the form U(s) = τ(s)− c(s), where τ(s) indicates
the average throughput, defined as the expected number of
packets successfully exchanged over the slot within the pair,5
and c(s) is the cost undergone to implement action s. As to
the latter, we generalise a cost function extensively used in
slotted Aloha with HD [4]: two distinct prices are foreseen for
initiating a HD transmission (c(tA) = c(tB) := chd) or a FD
link (c(tfd) := cfd), whereas we set c(w) = 0. The definition is
broadly applicable and captures, e.g. the cost to implement an
action or the energy spent to transmit the packet. We remark
how the choice of a throughput-based payoff aims to highlight
a key tradeoff that emerges in FD networks. In fact, while the
ability for both nodes in a pair to transmit simultaneously can
potentially double the number of exchanged data units, it also
leads to a higher aggregate level of interference, detrimental
for the decoding probability. The blend of the two effects is
captured by the very definition of τ(s).
4Clearly, the success probability conditioned on sj = tA and sj = tB are
swapped with respect to the ones experienced at Bi.
5Note that the expectation that defines τ(s) for a player is with respect to
both the fading coefficients for the involved links and the strategy followed
by the competitor over the current slot, which drives the interference level I.
To calculate the average throughput, let us focus without
loss of generality on player Pi. Clearly, if the node pair re-
mains silent, τ(w) = 0. Conversely, if a HD link is instantiated
from Ai to Bi, at most one data unit can be exchanged, and
delivery is successful with probability ps(Bi | sj). Averaging
over the strategy of the competing player, we readily have
τ(tA) = Esj [ps(Bi | sj)] = ϕ(piw+ιfpitA+ιcpitB+ιcιfpitfd).
Similarly, when strategy tB is picked
τ(tB) = Esj [ps(Ai | sj)] = ϕ(piw+ιcpitA+ιfpitB+ιcιfpitfd).
Finally, if a FD connection is established, no packet is de-
livered (probability [1− ps(Ai|sj)] [1− ps(Bi|sj)]); only one
data unit gets through (probability ps(Ai|sj)[1− ps(Bi|sj)] +
ps(Bi|sj)[1 − ps(Ai|sj)]); or both packets contribute to the
throughput (probability ps(Ai|sj)ps(Bi|sj)). Taking the aver-
age over sj leads after some manipulations to
τ(tfd) = βϕ
[
2piw+(ιc+ ιf )pitA +(ιc+ ιf )pitB +2ιcιfpitfd
]
.
From these results, the average utility function U(s) follows
directly, and is reported for convenience in (1) at the bottom
of the page.
III. MIXED NASH EQUILIBRIA
For the system described in Sec. II, we aim at investigating
the existence and structure of MNE without strictly dominated
actions (i.e. so that for a player no action always yields a
higher utility regardless of the one of the other player). This
line of study allows to understand which medium sharing
strategies in terms of access probabilities are appealing from
a single user’s perspective, leaning on game theory to derive
MAC design insights. By definition, and considering the
symmetry of the setting, we are thus interested in identifying
a p.m.f. pi such that the average utility U(s) of a player is the
same regardless of the selected strategy s ∈ S . A complete
characterisation is offered by the following result:
Theorem 1: The considered topology can admit a MNE
with no strictly dominated actions only if ϕιcιf ≤ chd ≤ ϕ and
cfd = 2βchd. Under these constraints, infinitely many MNE
exist, obtained by picking pitfd in the interval
ϕ(ιc + ιf )− 2chd
ϕ(ιc + ιf − 2ιcιf ) ≤ pitfd ≤
ϕ− chd
ϕ(1− ιcιf ) (2)
and setting
piw = pitfd
ιc + ιf − 2ιcιf
2− ιc − ιf +
2chd − ϕ(ιc + ιf )
ϕ(2− ιc − ιf )
pitA = pitB = −pitfd
1− ιcιf
2− ιc − ιf +
ϕ− chd
ϕ(2− ιc − ιf )
(3)
Proof: To prove the necessary conditions, let us focus
without loss of generality on action tA, whose utility is
reported in (1). Recalling that ιc, ιf < 1 and
∑
s∈S pis = 1,
U(tA) ≤ ϕ − chd. Thus, for any chd > ϕ, action tA would
be strictly dominated by action w (i.e. U(tA) < U(w) = 0,
∀pi), in contrast with the sought MNE. Similarly, since
ιcιf < ιc < ιf < 1, the average throughput seen by a player
selecting action tA is maximised for pitfd = 1. Then,
U(tA) ≥ ϕιcιf − chd and w would be strictly dominated by tA
for any chd < ϕιcιf . As to the second part of the theorem, we
observe that, since U(w) = 0, a mixed strategy pi is a MNE
iff U(pitA) = U(pitB) = U(pitfd) = 0 under the constraint∑
s∈S pis = 1. From (1), this translates into the system of
linear equations ApiT = bT , where
A =

ϕ ϕ ιf ϕ ιc ϕ ιcιf
ϕ ϕ ιc ϕ ιf ϕ ιcιf
2β ϕ βϕ (ιc + ιf ) βϕ (ιc + ιf ) 2βϕ ιcιf
1 1 1 1

b is the row vector (chd, chd, cfd, 1), and (·)T indicates the
transpose operator. It is easy to verify that the third row of the
coefficient matrix equals the sum of the first two multiplied by
β. Thus, rank(A) = 3 and, by the Rouche´-Capelli theorem,
the system admits infinite solutions over a space of dimension
1 iff cfd = 2βchd. Eqs. (2) and (3) follow after arithmetic
manipulations by solving with respect to piw, pitA and pitB under
the constraints piw, pitA , pitB ∈ [0, 1].
Theorem 1 offers relevant insights on the problem. In the
first place, it highlights how a MNE can be reached only if
the cost for establishing a FD link scales proportionally to
that undergone for a HD one, i.e. cfd = 2βchd. From this
standpoint, the result pinpoints the key role of self-interference
cancellation accuracy: the higher the residual SI level (i.e. the
lower β), the lower the cost the system designer can charge for
a FD link in order to reach an equilibrium and compensate for
the worsened decoding performance. Secondly, the theorem
reveals how the system can settle – for any set of network
parameters – to one of infinitely many MNE involving FD
transmissions (i.e. with pitfd > 0). Such an outcome is non-
obvious and particularly appealing, as it confirms how one
can indeed drive the players to an equilibrium that leverages
the new technology by properly setting the costs. Further
light on this aspect is shed by Fig. 2, which reports (shaded
region) the values of pitfd leading to a MNE when varying
chd. As discussed, any cost outside the interval [ϕιcιf , ϕ]
prevents the existence of equilibria without strictly dominated
actions. More interestingly, the plot highlights how MNE
with larger values of pitfd are attainable only resorting to
lower costs. Indeed, while for pitfd = 0 the cost can span
between ϕ(ιc + ιf )/2 and ϕ,6 medium access policies with
pitfd approaching 1 restrict chd to its minimum (i.e. ϕιcιf ). This
behaviour can be explained observing how players engaging
more often in FD exchanges generate higher interference
6The former value follows by setting pitfd = 0 in (3) and by imposing the
constraint piw ≤ 1.
U(w) = 0 U(tA) = ϕ (piw + ιfpitA + ιcpitB + ιcιfpitfd)− chd
U(tB) = ϕ (piw + ιfpitA + ιcpitB + ιcιfpitfd)− chd U(tfd) = βϕ
[
2piw + (ιc + ιf )pitA + (ιc + ιf )pitB + 2ιcιfpitfd
]− cfd (1)
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Fig. 2. The shaded region indicates values of pitfd that lead to a MNE for
a given chd. α = 3.5, θ = 4, κ = 1 and reference SNR Pd−α/N = 10.
which, in turn, lowers the success probability. A proportional
reduction of the charging policies stands as the only way to
enable MNE. From this viewpoint, Theorem 1 also offers a
handy tool for system design, allowing to determine the costs
of HD and FD links for the system to reach an equilibrium at
a desired operating point in terms of medium access strategies.
For the remainder of our discussion, it is useful to label the
boundaries C1 and C2 of the equilibrium region, stated in (2)
and reported for convenience in Fig. 2. Notably, inspection
of (3) reveals how MNE over C2 involve no HD links (i.e.
pithd = 0), while the ones over C1 see players never refraining
from accessing the channel (piw = 0).
A. On the Network Optimality of MNE
The possibility to drive the system to multiple equilibria
involving any desired fraction of FD connections triggers the
natural question of whether such operating conditions are also
meaningful from a network perspective. Indeed, while the
access strategy profile with piw = 1 (chd = ϕ) is a MNE,
it hardly represents a desirable working point. Similarly, an
equilibrium with pitfd = 1 (chd = ϕιcιf ) might not be effective
when the two players are close to each other, as the high level
of mutual interference might lead to a very low packet delivery
rate. We delve into this aspect by considering the aggregate
throughput Ta, defined as the mean number of packets per slot
successfully exchanged within the four-node network. More
specifically, the quantity depends on the actions undertaken by
the players, and we are interested in the statistical average over
a distribution pi, which we constrain for the sake of fairness
to satisfy pitA = pitB := pithd (i.e. piw + 2pithd + pitfd = 1). The
computation of Ta requires the inspection of all 16 players’
actions combinations, which we report in Appendix. For each
of them, in turn, the two-pair throughput follows from suitably
applying the approach of Sec. II. Simple arithmetic eventually
leads to a compact expression in pithd and pitfd :
Ta = 4ϕ(pithd + βpitfd)
[
1− pithd (2− ιc− ιf )− pitfd(1− ιcιf )
]
.
(4)
Despite the clean structure of (4), finding the maximum
throughput T ∗a in closed-form is not trivial. We observe instead
how the problem is to be solved within the closed region
R ⊂ R2, with boundary ∂R = ∂R1 ∪ ∂R2 ∪ ∂R3 defined by
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
non-admissible
configurations
lower
interference
higher
interference
pi∗ ∈ ∂R2
pitA , pitB = 0
pi∗ ∈ ∂R1
pitfd = 0
pi∗ ∈ ∂R3
piw = 0
pi∗
∈ ∂R2
ιc
ι f
Fig. 3. Maximum throughput configurations varying ιc and ιf . β = 0.7.
the segments ∂R1 = {(pithd , pitfd)|pithd ∈ [0, 1/2], pitfd = 0},
∂R2 = {(pithd , pitfd)|pithd = 0, pitfd ∈ [0, 1]} and ∂R3 =
{(pithd , pitfd)|pithd ∈ [0, 1/2], pitfd = 1 − 2pithd}. If we now take
the partial derivatives of Ta over pithd and pitfd , it is possible
to verify that the function has a unique critical point, which
falls out of R for all parameters configurations. Thus, the
maximum is found for a p.m.f. pi∗ that lies on ∂R, where
Ta becomes a tractable function of a single variable. This
brings a first interesting remark, as we infer that the peak
throughput is always achieved having at least one of the
medium access probabilities piw, pithd , or pitfd , set to zero.
Moreover, the original problem reduces to identifying the
highest among the maxima exhibited by Ta over the three
segments composing ∂R, whose values are reported in (5).
Which of the three actually coincides with T ∗a depends on the
specific parameters of the network. From this standpoint, while
conceptually simple, an exact characterisation of all possible
configurations would be cumbersome. More interestingly, we
introduce the following result:
Theorem 2: The topology under consideration always
admits a MNE with no strictly dominated actions that reaches
the maximum aggregate throughput.
Proof: It is sufficient to show that all the p.m.f. leading
to a maximum of Ta (reported in (5)) indeed instantiate a
MNE. Assume first that maximum throughput is achieved
over ∂R2, so that pithd = 0. In this case, the result is proven
recalling the discussion of Fig. 2. In fact, for any pitfd , a MNE
does exist over the boundary C2, where pithd = 0. Similarly,
any configuration obtained moving along ∂R3 (i.e. piw = 0)
corresponds to a MNE over the boundary C1 of the equilibria
region. Finally, assume that T ∗a is achieved on ∂R1. From (5),
when ιc + ιf ≤ 1, throughput-maximisation requires pitfd = 0
and pithd = 1/[2(2 − ιc − ιf )]. Plugging these values into
(3) shows how the p.m.f. indeed represents a MNE, achieved
setting chd = ϕ/2. Likewise, for ιc + ιf > 1, T ∗a is reached
for pitfd = 0 and pithd = 1/2, which is also, from (3), a MNE
when chd = ϕ(ιc + ιf )/2.
We then conclude that the system always admits a MNE
that is also optimal from a network perspective by a suitable
choice of the policy costs. Additional insights are captured
by Fig. 3, which reports by different colours the access
conditions leading to the peak aggregate throughput. Results
were obtained by means of numerical evaluation of (5) for
any possible configurations of system parameters embedded
by ιc and ιf , and assuming β = 0.7. As expected, when the
interference level between the pairs is low (ιc, ιf ∼ 1), e.g. due
to a large distance between them, an aggressive solution where
nodes either wait or transmit in FD mode yields the largest
throughput. Increasing the impact of the mutual disturbance,
the optimal point starts embedding also HD links, up to the
point where giving up FD completely becomes convenient
(pitfd = 0). Finally, when the interference level is severe (low
ιc and ιf ), the best solution is again to defer access – with
high probability – or to be aggressive (FD link) in the hope
that both packets will get through if the competitor waits.
While the derived result is remarkable, proper mechanism
design shall recall that changes in the cost policies may
lead to distinct MNE with different performance. A relevant
question is thus how sensitive Ta is to variations in chd. The
issue is tackled in Fig. 4, which reports for any value of
pitfd the corresponding price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the
ratio of T ∗a to the minimum aggregate throughput over all
possible MNE [7]. Two settings are depicted, instantiating high
(ιc = 0.1, ιf = 0.2) and low (ιc = 0.6, ιf = 0.7) cross-
pair interference. As expected, the PoA diverges for pitfd → 0,
since in these conditions the null-throughput MNE piw = 1
(chd = ϕ) becomes admissible (see Fig. 2). More interestingly,
the plot pinpoints how care is required in setting the costs
under harsh interference conditions, e.g. due to pairs that are
close to each other. Deviations from the optimal pricing policy
lead in fact to severe losses in terms of throughput, all the
more so when nodes attempt FD connections. The issue eases
considerably under lighter interference, where a large fraction
of MNE offer similar (and close to optimal) performance. In
such conditions, this desirable feature is further enhanced by
improving SI cancellation capabilities (β = 0.9, dashed line).
The effect is reversed for severe cross-pair disturbance, when
lower SI levels lead to an increase of the peak throughput
but are not enough to boost the worst performance among all
MNE.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Focussing on a 4-node topology with FD-capable terminals
and Aloha-based medium access, this letter characterised the
existence and structure of MNE. It was shown that an equilib-
rium optimal also from a networking viewpoint always exists.
Commented results offer first design insights, and are meant
to further stimulate game-theoretic research for FD networks,
considering broader ad hoc topologies. Future work includes a
study of pure NE as well as of algorithms leading the system
to a desired equilibrium.
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APPENDIX I
DERIVATION OF THE AGGREGATE THROUGHPUT
Following the definition of Sec. III, the average aggregate
throughput can be expressed as
τn =
∑
s∈S2
P[ (s1, s2) = s ] τ(s) (6)
where τ(s) is the number of packets delivered over a slot
within the two pairs given profile s, averaged over the distri-
bution of the involved fading coefficients. The calculation of
τn can then simply proceed by inspection of the 16 possible
strategy combinations, leaning on the derivation of the success
probability in Sec. II and recalling the independence of the
fading coefficients. In details:
• the profile (w,w), selected with probability pi2w, clearly
brings no contribution to the throughput;
• 4 profiles involve the transmission of a single node, while
all others remain silent. Each such profile occurs with
probability piwpithd , and leads to τ(s) = ϕ (at most one
packet is delivered, with probability ϕ);
• 2 profiles, each of probability pi2thd , see the transmis-
sion of the two closest nodes (i.e. either A1 and A2,
or B1 and B2). In this situation, one packet may
go through while the other fails (overall probability
2ϕιc(1 − ϕιc)) or both nodes may succeed and two
data units be delivered (probability (ϕιc)2). We thus get
τ(s) = 2ϕιc(1− ϕιc) + 2(ϕιc)2 = 2ϕιc;
• 2 profiles see the transmission of the two farthest nodes
(i.e. A1 and B2, or B1 and A2). Following the argument
just described, each has probability pi2thd and τ(s) = 2ϕιf ;
• 2 profiles involve the FD transmission of one pair, while
the other remains silent (probability piwpitfd ). Both packets
are successful with probability (βϕ)2, while a single
success occurs with overall probability 2βϕ(1−βϕ). The
average throughput follows as τ(s) = 2βϕ;
∂R1 : T ∗a = ϕ/(2− ιc − ιf ) pitfd = 0 pithd = min{1/2, 1/[2(2− ιc − ιf )]}
∂R2 : T ∗a = βϕ/(1− ιcιf ) pitfd = min{1, 1/[2(1− ιcιf )]} pithd = 0
∂R3 : T ∗a =
ϕ
[
ιcιfβ(ιc + ιf )
]2
(2β − 1)(ιc + ιf − 2ιcιf ) pitfd =
(1− β)(ιc + ιf )− ιcιf
(2β − 1)(2ιcιf − ιc − ιf ) pithd = (1− pitfd)/2
(5)
• with probability pitfdpithd , one player initiates a FD link
while the other attempts a HD communication (4 possible
profiles). All links (i.e. 3 packets) succeed with probabil-
ity (βϕ)2ιcιf · ϕιcιf . Two data units are exchanged if
both nodes of the FD pair decode while the HD link fails
(probability (βϕ)2ιcιf ·(1−ϕιcιf )) or if the HD link suc-
ceeds and one of the FD connection does not (probability
βϕιc(1− βϕιf ) · ϕιcιf + βϕιf (1− βϕιc) · ϕιcιf ). Fi-
nally, a single packet is delivered if either the FD con-
nection fails while the HD receiver decodes (probability
(1 − βϕιc)(1 − βϕιf ) · ϕιcιf ), or if one of the FD-
operated nodes succeeds and all others do not (probability
βϕιc(1 − βϕιf ) · (1 − ϕιcιf ) + βϕιf (1 − βϕιc) · (1 −
ϕιcιf )). Combining the enumerated possibilities, brief
manipulations lead to τ(s) = ϕ
[
β(ιc + ιf ) + ιcιf
]
;
• with probability pi2tfd both players instantiate a FD con-
nection. Simple arguments show that: 4 packets are de-
coded with probability (βϕιcιf )4; 4 combinations, each
of probability (βϕιcιf )3 · (1 − βϕιcιf ), bring delivery
of 3 data units; 6 configurations allow retrieval of 2
packets (probability (βϕιcιf )2 · (1 − βϕιcιf )2); and 4
combinations are to be considered for a single success,
with probability βϕιcιf · (1− βϕιcιf )3. The throughput
of the (tfd, tfd) profile thus follows as 4βϕιcιf .
Plugging the enumerated cases into (6) leads to (4) after
basic arithmetic manipulations.
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